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Abstract 
 
Western Sahara has been in a state of political crisis since Spain granted the 
territory to Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. While Morocco has attempted to 
incorporate the region within its borders, the Polisario Front (Frente Popular 
de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) has challenged Morocco’s 
claims and proclaimed they are the voice of the indigenous Sahrawi people. 
Algeria, home to a majority of the Sahrawi refugees, continues to support 
the Polisario and their goal of independence from Morocco.  
 Yet, does Algeria have an ulterior motive for their actions beyond 
support for a displaced people? This thesis examines how Algeria has utilized 
the Western Sahara conflict to undermine Morocco’s plans for incorporating 
the territory. Applying hegemonic stability and rivalry theory to the conflict, 
Algeria’s methods of challenging Moroccan claims are analyzed to see how 
its actions have weakened the objectives of Morocco towards Western 
Sahara as well as the perception of Morocco within the Maghreb region and 
internationally. The thesis suggests that as Algeria continues its support for 
the Polisario, it may have successfully challenged Morocco’s attempt to 
incorporate the territory within its borders. 
1 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Western Sahara, with Berms marked. The Polisario Front (governing party of the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic) control areas east of the berms and temporary capital located outside Tindouf, 
Algeria. Morocco controls areas west of the berms. 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Westernsaharamap.png) 
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Chapter 1: Conceptualizing Algeria in the Western Sahara 
conflict 
 
Why is there a continued conflict in Western Sahara? After nearly forty 
years of conflict and cease-fires, negotiations and UN involvement, 
Morocco is no closer to achieving a successful end-game in which they 
control the territory. The Polisario Front (Frente Popular de Liberación 
de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), a rebel group against Spain, 
Mauritania and Morocco in the 1970s which struggled for independence 
and now is recognized as the governing body for the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic (SADR) continues to demand for independence 
and recognition against Morocco’s wishes. To this day the conflict is at 
a standstill with both sides continuing to advocate different actions 
that would settle the conflict – for Morocco, official recognition of its 
claims on the territory and merging it fully within the state, for the 
Polisario, recognition of independence and properly establishing the 
SADR in El Aaiún. 
 This thesis is based on the following hypothesis: Algeria’s 
support for the Polisario is a strategy by Algeria to become the sole 
regional hegemon in the Maghreb. Regional hegemon is the 
dominant state within a region, based on the concepts created by 
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Kindelberger and Russett in the formation of hegemonic stability. In 
terms of region, it is defined as a cluster of states within 
geographically bound areas. In this case, Algeria and Morocco are 
bound together due to proximity and location within the Maghreb 
(Arabic for West).  The Maghreb region consists of Morocco, Algeria, 
Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and the Western Sahara territory (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Map of the Maghreb (www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/32/017.html) 
The states in the region share a geographic zone linked around the 
Atlas Mountains and the coastal plains of the Mediterranean Sea. 
Historically the Maghreb has been classified as the northwest of Africa 
and originally was only Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and western Libya. 
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Mauritania was grouped with the region in 1989 after the founding of 
the Arab Mahgreb Union (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012). The region 
shares common history due to conquest by the Ottomans as well as 
France and Italy. 
 The argument  is that Algeria continues to be involved in the 
Western Sahara conflict from a power politics position against their 
rival Morocco, and that its political goals for the North West African 
region are supported by maintaining support for the Polisario Front 
against Morocco. While both Morocco and Algeria seek to be the 
dominant force in the region and over the future of Western Sahara, 
not as much scholarly work has been done on how Algeria has 
undermined Morocco, especially in regards to Western Sahara. This 
makes examining Algeria’s role in the conflict more relevant to the 
discussion and adds a new dimension to understanding the relationship 
between the Moroccan government and the Polisario. Singling out 
Algeria’s role in the conflict allows its position to be analyzed against 
Moroccan interests in Western Sahara to see how regional views on 
the conflict have shifted. It allows for further discussion on how Algeria 
could be viewed as a viable hegemon in the region due to its ability to 
prevent Morocco from achieving its political goals in regards to 
Western Sahara. 
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 Why single out Algeria and Morocco for consideration for 
dominance in the region? Considering the relative size of the region 
and spending power the states have militarily (Table 1), only Libya  
would be able to challenge Morocco and Algeria for supremacy in the  
 region. Tunisia spends far too little in military spending and is 
currently in the process of moving towards a more democratic, yet 
possibly more fundamentalist state in the wake of the Arab Spring 
(Zelin, 2011) and Mauritania continues to struggle economically and 
politically since independence.  
Table 1: General statistics on the states in the Maghreb region1 
                                                           
1
 Information on all states gathered from the CIA Factbook, accessed July 2012 
 Morocco Algeria Mauritania Tunisia Libya 
Population 32,309,239 
(2011) 
35,406,303 
(2011) 
3,359,185 
(2011) 
10,732,900 
(2011) 
6,733,620 
(2012) 
Area  
(sq.km) 
446,550 2,381,741 1,030,700 163,610 1,759,54 
GDP  
(US 
Dollar) 
163 billion 
(2011 
est.) 
264.1 
billion 
(2011) 
7.242 
billion 
(2011 
est.) 
101.7 
billion 
(2011 
est.) 
92.62 
billion 
(2010 
est.) 
N/A 
(2011) 
Military 
Budget 
5% of GDP 
(2003 
est.) 
3.3% of 
GDP 
(2006) 
5.5% of 
GDP 
(2006) 
1.4% of 
GDP 
(2006) 
3.9% of 
GDP (2005 
est.) 
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However, with the marginalization of Libya during the end of the 
twentieth century and the fall of Col. Mummar Gadaffi in 2011, Libya 
has become less secure and viable as an alternative to Morocco and 
Algeria in the region. Further, the thesis is focused around the 
problems in achieving a solution in Western Sahara, which Tunisia, 
Mauritania and Libya have been removed from for some time – 
although Libya had supported the Polisario under Gadhafi (Zunes and 
Mundy, 2010) and Mauritania has recognized the Polisario as the 
official representative of the Sahrawi (Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2008). Morocco and Algeria, while having faced 
their own protests during the Arab Spring (Amos, 2012 and Nossiter, 
2012), have been able for the most part avoid major challenges to the 
government’s authority and have emerged stronger with the instability 
in Libya. 
With the Algerian government supporting the Polisario and 
defending the demands of the Sahrawi for an independent state, 
questions should arise in regards to its own interest in the conflict. 
What role does Algeria play in the conflict? How has Algeria been able 
to influence the international community’s perception on Morocco’s 
interest in Western Sahara? Can they gain an advantage over Morocco 
without directly participating in the negotiations towards a settlement?  
By supporting the Polisario and the Sahrawi people, is Algeria pursuing 
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its own agenda which could frustrate efforts towards a settlement? 
These questions are the focus of this thesis 
The operating theory for the work surmises that a state will 
support opposition groups in a neighboring state if it will enable the 
state to become a regional hegemon. Theoretically, the idea of the 
regional hegemon is built off the work of John Mearsheimer. In his 
work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics he argues the notion of 
“offensive” hegemony (4-5) in which states and great powers alike 
seek out opportunities to undermine rivals. As states desire as much 
power as possible and try to maximize relative gains in power (23), it 
continues to drive competition between states. The idea is further 
developed by authors like Michael McGinnis, who argued the idea of 
regional rivalry within the framework of Cold War politics and 
competition (1990). While Mearsheimer’s work deals with “great 
powers” like the United States and the Soviet Union, his concepts on 
hegemony and the role of regional power politics allows for greater 
application and perspectives within the confines of this work. 
Mearsheimer’s work also explains the concept of the regional 
hegemon, which sees states trying to exert dominance over others on 
a regional level.  
On a global scale, the United States has been considered the 
main hegemon in economic, military and political spheres. The regional 
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aspect to hegemony suggests that dominance by one state can be 
exerted on a smaller scale within the international community. By 
having states compete against each other for dominance and 
leadership on a smaller scale, rivalries between states can develop as 
they seek new ways to gain prominence on the local level and position 
themselves as the hegemon within its region. Utilizing the work done 
by others on rivalries between states only adds to the development of 
Mearsheimer’s work and understanding of how  power and influence 
work on the micro levels of state-state politics. 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a better understanding 
of how hegemonic stability can be applied to the regional or 
subregional level, in particular within the context of regional rivals 
Algeria and Morocco. Since regional rivalry is still being developed 
theoretically, the games the Great Powers played in the past can be 
applied in some ways to the actions taken by smaller actors seeking to 
promote its interests and goals amongst its neighbors. The focus of 
this analysis will be on the behavior of Algeria towards its rival 
Morocco, and whether the failures of achieving a final agreement on 
the Western Sahara conflict is a result of Algeria’s rivalry with Morocco 
for regional hegemony. In other words, is Algeria’s objective to 
undermine Morocco’s goal of incorporation of Western Sahara into 
greater Morocco, or is Algeria’s support of the Polisario Front and the 
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Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) a strategy towards 
becoming the hegemonic power in the region. 
 With Morocco and Algeria considered rival hegemons in the 
Maghreb (Cordesman, Burke and Nerguizian, 2010), studying Algeria’s 
role as a possible deterrent towards peace in Western Sahara allows 
for a better understanding of how states can interfere with intrastate 
politics and create the conditions that allow for relative gains. Such 
gains, Mearsheimer argues, allow for greater security of the state. He 
sees the system as one within a realist framework, without the right 
agency to protect states from each other they must become more 
ambitious and seek out power against its rivals. For a state to achieve 
hegemony within a region, it must capitalize on beneficial situations 
that better position itself against others (21). Building on the work of 
McGinnis, this capitalization will allow the state to have an advantage 
over regional issues and better itself in the long term. 
 To understand Algeria’s position in the conflict, the thesis will 
take a case study approach towards both Morocco and Algeria in 
regards to Western Sahara. It will examine Morocco’s interest in the 
area and how Algeria has challenged those interests. The model will 
look at analytical, rather than quantitative, evidence in order to 
understand the relationship between the rivals as well as explain how 
Algeria has utilized its relationship with the Polisario to undermine 
10 
 
Moroccan interest in Western Sahara. The analysis is based on the 
argument that Algeria has regional hegemonic ambitions, and is 
utilizing the Polisario to challenge Morocco for hegemonic supremacy in 
the Maghreb. 
The following chapters will examine the issue of hegemonic 
stability, rivalry and how Algeria has made attempts to challenge their 
rival for dominance of the Maghreb region. Chapter 2 will further 
discuss the concepts of hegemony and rivalry. Examining how rivalries 
play out will help to understand Algerian and Moroccan concerns and 
points of conflict. Chapter 3 will explain the Western Sahara conflict as 
well as Morocco’s objectives for incorporation of the territory into 
“greater Morocco.” The chapter will also examine the relationship 
between Morocco and Algeria in order to better understand its goals 
and objectives in the conflict. Chapter 4 will examine Algeria’s strategy 
in the conflict, looking at whether its actions towards Morocco have 
undermined Morocco’s goals with Western Sahara and its ability to 
become a regional hegemon. Furthermore the section will determine if 
Algeria has benefitted from weakening Morocco’s position on issues 
surrounding Western Sahara and thereby achieved regional hegemon 
status within the Maghreb.  
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Chapter 2: The regionalization of hegemony 
Literature on hegemony has from the beginning sought to understand 
how states are able to exert control on others in the international 
system. Those within the field have worked to understand how one 
entity can dominate the political or economic discussion any number of 
states. The idea of hegemony is built off the work of Krasner and 
Russett, which dwell on the diminished influence of the United States 
in the world after the Vietnam War. Linking economic factors with 
political ambition and control, Kindelberger, Krasner and Slidell sought 
to better understand how states gain, maintain and lose power. The 
developments in this period helped to explain the dominance of the US 
(and the United Kingdom before World War II) and how it was losing 
its ability to lead the world. 
 Stephen Krasner sought to understand the economic 
arrangement of state power politics. He argued the need to 
understand power politics as well as trade under the auspices of 
opportunity costs in terms of trade (1976, 320). Utilizing this idea, he 
suggests the need for small states to become more open in order to 
grow economically. Such openness would allow smaller states to 
compete better as well as become more integrated with larger states 
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that have the perceived advantages within the trade system. This 
dependence would lead to states to align over time with those who 
present the best opportunity to benefit far longer – which would 
require states to align with the major powers in the world (the US and 
the Soviet Union).  
 Krasner also point out that in a hegemonic system smaller states 
would take advantage of being within the system since they would 
grow economically although its own political power is limited (Krasner, 
322). Smaller states become an intricate part of the greater 
hegemonic system since they have much to gain economically while 
not threatening the political system as a whole or exerting leadership 
(Kindleberger, 1981, 249). This is important in understanding how 
hegemonic stability theory can be applied to rivalry theory, because 
the lack of opposition against international hegemons like the US, the 
Soviet Union or Great Britain (before World War II) would allow the 
smaller states to position themselves against each other on the lower 
level of the political system. This repositioning within hegemony allows 
each state to show why they would be more important than its rivals 
and allow for more recent competition between the states. 
 Understanding Krasner and Kindelberger’s early works help to 
bridge the gap between the emergence of the field in the 1960s and 
1970s and how authors like Mearsheimer understood the context in 
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the 1990s. As the United States has become the singular power in the 
post-Cold War era, discussion shifted towards understanding how a 
state or states could maintain hegemonic control. Bruce Russett, for 
example, has sought to understand hegemony through alternative 
methods like cultural diffusion rather than in the traditional means of 
trade and economic superiority. He suggested (1985) that the success 
of the hegemon was through the allocation of private goods, and that 
the shift is based on the whole global system being modified by the US 
to maintain American interest and dominance (Russett, 208). Even he, 
however, saw the emergence of peace issues in the Third World and 
regime stability as a threat to American dominance.  The work of 
Krasner and Russett, who early on surmised the role of western 
powers as a means of creating hegemonic poles, helps to create the 
concepts that John Mearsheimer would question and reexamine. 
 Mearsheimer’s concepts of great powers became better 
understood in his work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, which 
sought to explain what power actually is and how states seek to 
survive. Based on this need for states to survive in an anarchical 
world, he suggests there is a level of fear and power maximization 
needed for a state to maintain its own presence in the world, 
suggesting a balancing requiring allies or resources to maintain 
leverage. While his work was based on European power politics, he 
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also attempted to explain the rise of China in the 21st century, 
suggesting that the US never acted as a true hegemon on the world 
stage but as a balancing force to the Soviets during the Cold War and 
against both Russia and China during the current decade. His work, 
based on the roles of European powers, does create a basis for 
understanding smaller hegemonic battles – especially his interest in 
the ideas of balance and unbalance multipolar. His sole focus on 
European hegemony and views on the US as a balancer and not a 
hegemon further allows his research and concepts to be extrapolated 
to smaller regional blocs like the Maghreb (Mearsheimer). 
 In terms of regional hegemony, Mearsheimer’s work in the field 
has led to others examining the same issues. This has also increased 
interest in understanding regional rivalries. While hegemonic stability 
looks at the economic value of a state’s power and the regional rival 
looks originally at the military aspect of state power, both deal with 
how states interact and perceive each other. Indeed, hegemonic 
stability theory itself holds a need for a rival to emerge against the 
perceived hegemon for the system to stay in balance – or for multiple 
parties to compete should a power vacuum occur due to the collapse 
of the previous dominant party. As rivalry studies have developed, 
they have taken from the hegemonic field the concepts of regime 
interest and security, transferring these concepts to the study of 
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smaller powers (McGinnis, 1990). By positioning towards security 
measures, the field is able to originally examine the relationships 
between small and large states. Over time, the work has been able to 
move away from the Cold War focus to try and examine relationships 
between smaller states. In turn, they offer a means to better explain 
and speculate on actions taken on the micro political level and any 
future ramifications.  
 Regional rivalry is considered more of a study of securitization of 
states, due in large part to the states used to study the concept. 
McGinnis’ earlier work focused on India and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq, 
Greece and Turkey, the Republic of Korea and the People’s Democratic 
Republic of Korea as well as Ethiopia and Somalia (111). He tried to 
frame the issue or rivalries between states along the lines of the Cold 
War – its own militarization was in many ways due to each state’s 
alliances with the US and the Soviet Union. In his work he examined 
issues of security and armament of states in response to its neighbors. 
In these cases, he saw its development through the scope of the end 
of the Cold War, which leads to some questions of relevance.  
Yet the pairings established by McGinnis give some idea of how 
regional rivalries develop and stay constant. From China and Japan’s 
historical conflict over Korea to their recent contest over oil access . 
While many states have begun to swing in favor of Chinese economic 
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interest in the region and within the developing world, Japan’s 
diplomatic experience makes states still willing to side with it, even if 
it’s kept quiet. As Japan has sought to strengthen their connections 
with Southeast Asia, they have moved into markets that had been 
under Chinese influence and both states have utilized soft power to 
influence states towards supporting their position (Sohn, 2010). 
Further, Japan has sought to use their own financial resources to 
undermine Chinese interested in the developing world, keeping an 
economic as well as security rivalry alive (Dreyer, 2006). India and 
Pakistan, meanwhile, have been rivals since before independence and 
division of British India in 1948 and their own rivalry continues to this 
day. While it is possible to suggest that India is by far the dominant 
force on the Indian subcontinent and could be the hegemon, issues 
surrounding Kashmir have led to several armed conflicts and a 
continuation of aggressive rhetoric between Dehli and Islamabad 
(Haidar, 2008/2009). 
While harder to connect when dealing with Greece and Turkey, 
especially as work done by Georgiou, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 
(1996) suggested empirically there was no armed rivalry between the 
states even while military expenditure went up, the suggestion of 
rivals tends to be applicable with the other cases as each state showed 
a willingness to align with a superpower based more on arms buildup 
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rather than something far greater like economics. In each state’s case 
it helped to set the tone for how the state can respond to actions 
taken by its own rivals over the next twenty years. McGinnis’ work on 
the subject also highlights the evolving nature of hegemonic stability 
and its focus on the Great Powers when addressing the behaviors of 
smaller actors within its own neighborhood. Like others (Roussea and 
Garcia-Retamero, 2007) who saw asymmetrical relations between 
neighbors leading towards threat fears, McGinnis sees the realist 
nature of rivalry within a zero-sum game. Like in hegemonic stability, 
rivalry theory sees the world through competition that leads in time to 
power being condensed in a small amount of states. 
 The development of the regional rivalry concept has helped to 
clarify how relationships between neighbors and rivals grow. It is 
suggested by some that the idea of a rivalry must be defined as 
competition within the zero-sum game framework (Goertz and Diehl, 
1992, 153). By taking a more realist approach on the subject, rivalries 
could focus less on the economic definitions found in hegemonic 
stability and better shape how rival hegemons can occur. When the 
idea of the zero-sum game is combined with “contested issues” 
(Bennet, 1996) which can lead to a disagreement “over the resolution 
of some issue(s) between them for an extended period of time 
(Bennet, 160),” the rival states involved in a struggle for influence and 
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control over a region have created its own sense of purpose that fuel 
the conflict between them. 
 The ideas of Goertz, Bennet and others have helped to spell out 
the ideas of regional rivalry and frame the various perspectives that 
help explain why states view its neighbors as rivals. Further, its 
concepts help to define the very nature of the conflicts the states have 
created amongst themselves or have had fostered onto them – be 
they based on spatial or positional conflicts as defined by Thompson in 
his work on principal rivalry (1995) or the simple issue of 
disagreements over conflict as defined by Bennet. The idea that rivalry 
can happen on a regional level may not be new, but the interest 
outside the confines of the Cold War is. Indeed, looking at the 
literature over the past twenty years shows signs of a redefining of the 
regional rivalry concept along lines of national security as well as 
economic issues that shape and define work on hegemonic stability.  
While this work is not looking at the economics of rivalry 
between states, the idea that economics, security and government can 
build a rivalry feeds into the ideas of stability that Krasner and others 
would argue in the 1960s. By bridging the economic necessity of 
hegemons with the natural rivalries that develop between states in 
certain regions, this suggests the actions taken by states in order to 
prevent one from gaining hegemonic control over the region are 
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normal actions taken in order to maintain a certain balance between 
the states. If one agrees with the zero-sum approach taken by Goertz 
and Diehl and others who apply rational choice towards the conflict 
between rivals, it would also build the idea of hegemonic stability 
towards a localized understanding. 
A different view of rivalry comes on the issues of the threat 
states pose towards each other. While there is a possible issue of 
identity involved in creating security issues through perceived threats 
(Roussea and Garcia-Retamero, 745), states who feel a weakness in 
military power sense the problems that develop into rivalry. Like 
McGinnis, the race to arm fuels the desires of those involved in a 
rivalry to emerge as the better armed and the better prepared for 
possible conflict. However, the threat can instead build into a power 
position that allows for states to dictate policy and actions to its 
neighbors (Dahl, 1957). If this is truly the case, then the actors 
involved in a rivalry would aspire to be viewed as the hegemon within 
its own relationship – and such a view would shape its own interests 
on the regional level. 
There has been even an attempt to understand a multi-level 
hegemony, which would see the regional and global hegemon fighting 
each other for access to new markets and an attempt to work between 
states (Deyermond, 2009). This different approach to rivalry studies 
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embraces the economic nature of hegemonic stability while seeing the 
willingness of states at different levels of global interaction secure 
themselves against each other. While work on Central Asia sees the 
complex links between the US as a global hegemon, Russia as the 
regional hegemon and Uzbekistan and China as emerging regional 
(and in China’s case, global) hegemons it also highlights how 
dominance can still occur at various levels of interaction from the 
economic and security levels. Comparatively, the ideas presented in 
this discussion can be applied to the actions taken by Morocco and 
Algeria against each other while dealing with actions taken by the US, 
France, Spain and international organizations all within the context of 
Western Sahara. In other words, the ideas of Kindelberger and Krasner 
when understanding economic supremacy and hegemony have led 
over time to the security issues that scholars like McGinnis and Bennet 
examine. In terms of the thesis, Algeria’s support of the Polisario could 
be taken as part of its rivalry with Morocco, and its goal of hegemony 
in the region a development of its relationship with its rival. 
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Chapter 3: Framing the narrative: Morocco, Algeria and 
Western Sahara 
 
This chapter is focused on explaining the complicated relationship 
between Morocco, Algeria and Western Sahara. The first part examines 
Western Sahara itself – its people, its history, its resources and 
geography. This creates a better sense of what the territory is and has 
to offer those who seek to control it. The second section deals with the 
War for Spanish (Western) Sahara and Morocco’s attempts to 
incorporate the rechristened Western Sahara as the southern 
provinces of Morocco. This section also examines the development of 
the Polisario Front, the establishment of the SADR and the rise of 
Algeria as the major sponsor of the front.  
The final section examines the rivalry between Algeria and 
Morocco – rooted in border disputes that help to develop each side’s 
interest in Western Sahara. Each section shows the historical nature of 
the conflict between the two rivals and how Western Sahara has 
become an issue between Algeria and Morocco. This conflict suggests 
how Morocco can challenge Algeria in the region for supremacy as well 
as how Algeria has sought to keep Morocco from gaining dominance 
over its neighbors.  
22 
 
Western Sahara: A Primer 
Western Sahara is a strip of land along the Atlantic coast of Africa. The 
territory sits on 266,000 sq. km of land, which borders Morocco, 
Algeria and Mauritania. The territory has a total coastline of 1,110 km 
and a total population of 522,928 (CIA, 2012). Many of the Sahrawi 
(Western Saharan) people do not live within the territory but rather in 
the camps outside of Tindouf, Algeria. When one looks at a map of 
Western Sahara, it becomes clear why many would assume it already 
was a part of Morocco. A majority of the population of Western Sahara 
descends from the Berber tribes of the region (Hodges, 1984), and are 
traditionally nomadic. The Berbers had been dependent on their 
nomadic traditions throughout the centuries for its state’s economy as 
well as basic survival (Hodges, 75). Since Spanish control ended in the 
1970s, Morocco has moved a number of Moroccans into the state for 
both work and, as believed by the Polisario, as a means to shift the 
population towards Moroccan sympathies (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). 
 The territory, while arid, is known for having one of the largest 
phosphate reserves in the world. The mineral, a necessity for fertilizers 
and farming, is considered a major resource for the region, and has 
already led to USD 1 billion a year in sales to Morocco (Simanowitz, 
2009). The rise in phosphates extraction comes in line with growth in 
iron, uranium and zirconium – all that help to build the case for a 
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major supplier of minerals on the world stage. Morocco and 
international companies have also sought to find oil and gas reserves 
along the coastline of Western Sahara (Simanowitz, 301), which would 
only add to the economic growth of the territory but currently are 
shifted to Morocco. There is also a belief the coastal areas of Western 
Sahara may present future oil revenues, with both the Moroccan and 
the SADR governments working in the early part of the millennium to 
secure contracts for future oil exploration once the Western Sahara 
question has been settled (Western Sahara Campaign, 2003). 
 In addition to minerals, Western Sahara is noted for its fishing 
waters. Morocco has profited from growth in the fisheries, thanks to 
deals worked out with the European Union in which Moroccan 
waterways are not defined. The failure of the EU and Morocco to 
establish a demarcation line for Western Sahara waters allows fishing 
to occur off the coast, which violates UN Resolution 1514(XV) (302). 
With the European Union increasing trade with Morocco without 
excluding the Western Saharan territory (which other states like the 
US have), it places Morocco in a position where they are profiting off 
sales that should not be allowed in the marketplace. Morocco has 
responded that the sale of resources is helping to fuel development in 
the territory (Borrell and Grushkin, 2010).  
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The conflict in the Spanish Sahara and the rise of the Polisario 
Western Sahara has had a long history of conflict that has shaped its 
history as well as relations between itself and its neighbors. The 
territory was first claimed by Spain at the 1884 Berlin Conference 
(Spector, 2009). At the time the population was mostly nomadic and 
Spain failed to make much of the territory over the years. In 1961 
Spain moved the Spanish Sahara’s status to non-self-governing 
territory under the auspices of the UN Charter (Spector). The UN, 
dealing with conflict between Spain and Morocco, would further push 
Spain towards allowing the Sahrawi a vote for independence in 1965, 
1967, 1968, 1972 and 1973 (Marks, 1976).  While facing several 
nationalist uprisings (Marks, 8) Spain would eventually withdraw from 
Spanish Sahara in 1975. The Polisario Front would arise during this 
period, rising up against Spain in 1973 as a means to assert the 
Sahrawi desire for independence (Ben-Meir, 2010). 
While Spain was in the middle of war and planning its eventual 
withdraw from the territory, other states would take interest. Morocco 
and Mauritania sought to claim the territory through historical links 
that the International Court of Justice rejected in October 1975 
(Spector). Undaunted, Morocco invaded the territory later that month 
and Spain, facing the possibility of war and an ailing Generalissimo 
Franco, agreed to terms to divide the Spanish Sahara between 
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Morocco and Mauritania. The Polisario shifted its attention to the new 
owners of the land, launching attacks on Moroccan and Mauritanian 
lands and eventually winning a peace treaty with Mauritania in 1979. 
Morocco would eventually regain Polisario-controlled lands in the 
1980s. To prevent further attacks, the Moroccan government 
proceeded to build high sand walls known as berms (similar to its war 
strategy with Algeria in 1963) as defensive points. The berms would 
expand over time to create diverging zones between the Polisario and 
the government. These would create the perceived “Free Zone” of the 
Polisario and the SADR at present. The Polisario would declare an 
independent government in exile from Algeria in 1975 that would be 
recognized by 75 governments and gain a seat in the Organization of 
African States in 1982. Morocco would leave the OAU at that time in 
protest and remains the only African state not a part of the successor 
organization, the African Union. 
The two sides would broker a peace accord in 1989 that called 
for an eventual vote on independence, autonomy or some other form 
of governance monitored by the UN. However, debate over the voting 
lists between the Polisario and Morocco in 1994 and 2000 have 
stymied any possible solution by a vote, and the Polisario has been 
critical of Moroccan attempts to remove an independence vote from 
the list. In the last decade there has been an emerging movement 
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within Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara against Morocco, calling 
themselves the Intifada with uprisings in 2005 and 2010, and the 
Polisario has suggested this would become the new form of protest 
against Morocco instead of armed conflict (Zunes and Mundy, 2010). 
In 2003 former US Secretary of State James Baker, serving as a 
special UN Envoy on Western Sahara, made an attempt to bring both 
sides to an agreement on a settlement, which would dismantle the 
SADR and establish a Western Sahara Authority, which would govern 
for five years within Morocco. Upon those five years, the population 
would vote for integration, autonomy or independence. Even with the 
allowance of Moroccan settlers in the region – illegal under the 
auspices of the Geneva Convention (Simanowitz) the Polisario and 
Algeria agreed to the terms, while Morocco rejected them outright. 
Morocco propose a new referendum that would allow for autonomy 
only in 2007, which the Polisario rejected and submitted its own 
proposal for a referendum. The UN Security Council requested both 
sides to mediate towards a solution (Simanowitz, 303) which failed to 
see results.  
As of 2012 the UN Mission to Western Sahara exists, working 
inside both the Moroccan and Polisario-controlled areas of the 
territory. With the mandate expected to be extended this year, there 
had been talks held in March to push for some sort of governance 
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settlement – with Algeria and Mauritania observing the talks (Arieff, 
2012). Those talks ended with a commitment towards further talks 
later in the year between the Polisario and Morocco, with both sides 
continuing to push their own agenda for a future settlement. However, 
due to the recent protests in Western Sahara (both before a during the 
Arab Spring movement of 2011) the Polisario has pushed for human 
rights to be brought back onto the agenda as a means to challenge 
Moroccan authority and to safeguard the local Sahrawi population from 
possible abuse (Simanowitz, 2012). 
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Table 2: Timeline of the Western Sahara Conflict2 
                                                           
2
 Information gathered for this timeline comes from Zunes, S. and J. Mundy. (2010) Western Sahara: 
War, Nationalism, and Conflict (Ir)resolution. Syracuse University Press, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Sahara_conflict and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Sahara_War 
 
1884 Spain granted control over what would become Spanish 
Sahara 
1958 Spain merges the Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro 
territories into Spanish Sahara 
1970 The Zemla Intifada occurs against the Spanish 
government in the territory, Span puts down the 
organization 
1973 The Polisario Front forms in Mauritania 
1975 Spain begins a negotiation of a handover of Spanish 
Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania 
Oct. 
16, 
1975 
The ICJ ruled that Spain should not have controlled 
Spanish Sahara and that Morocco and Mauritania had 
historical links, but that should not hinder the right to 
self-determination. 
Nov. 6, 
1975 
The Green March occurs, sending Moroccan troops into 
Spanish Sahara 
Nov. 
14, 
1975 
The Madrid Accord is signed by Spain, Morocco and 
Mauritania ceding control of the Spanish Sahara. The UN 
fails to recognize the Accord 
1975-
1991 
The Western Sahara War 
Feb. 
27, 
1976 
The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is proclaimed by 
the Polisario Front 
Aug. 5, 
1979 
Mauritania and the Polisario sign a peace accord, ending 
Mauritania’s involvement in the conflict 
Aug. 
1979 
Morocco annexes all of Western Sahara, taking claim to 
the Mauritanian portion of the territory ceded by Spain in 
1975. 
1980s Morocco builds berms to protect the Souther Provinces 
from attack by the Polisario 
 
1984 The SADR wins a seat at the OAU/AU. Morocco leaves the 
organization. 
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Table 2 continued 
Sept. 
6, 1991 
A cease-fire is declared by Morocco and the Polisario. The 
UN pushes for a referendum to determine the final status 
of Western Sahara 
1991 Settlement Plan (Resolution 658) endorsed by the UN, 
proposing referendum on independence, autonomy or 
incorporation of Western Sahara. Vote never occurs 
1997 Houston Agreement orchestrated by the UN to hold a vote 
in 1998. Morocco and the Polisario disagree on how census 
is to occur and who counts as Sahrawi. Vote never occurs 
2001 Baker Plan I proposed, which would only allow Western 
Sahara autonomy. Algeria and Polisaro reject the plan 
2003 Baker Plan II proposed, creating a Western Sahara 
Authority which would govern for five years before an 
autonomy vote would occur. Algeria and the Polisaro 
agreed eventually to the plan and the UN endorsed the 
plan, but Morocco rejected it due to the possibility of 
independence. 
May 
2005 
First Independence Intifada breaks out in Moroccan-held 
territories 
Oct. 9, 
2010 
Gdeim Izik set up as a protest camp in Western Sahara, 
taken down in November 
Feb. 
2011 
Fresh round of protests in Western Sahara, inspired by 
both Gdeim Izik and the Arab Spring protest movement 
2010 – 
present 
Current UN Envoy Christopher Ross has held nine rounds 
of talks to bridge differences between Morocco and the 
Polisario over any future settlement. Algeria and Mauritania 
attend as observers. So far, nothing has happened to 
change Moroccan or Polisario positions 
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Algeria and Morocco: Seeds of Rivalry 
While the focus of the work is on the Western Sahara issue and how 
Algeria is trying to utilize the territory to undermine Morocco, it is 
important to understand both the history of the Western Sahara 
conflict as well as the conflict between Algeria and Morocco. Algeria 
and Morocco had both been under the rule of France – Algeria as a 
Regency as early as 1837 (Heggoy, 1970) and Morocco as a 
protectorate in 1912 (Protectorate Treaty, 1912). France had signed 
an agreement with the Moroccan government not to militarize certain 
areas under Moroccan control but while both states were under French 
rule both states saw official borders created in 1938 that would move 
the Draa Valley – which includes the Tindouf region used by the 
Polisario as its base today – into Algerian territory.  
Morocco would contest this claim upon independence, arguing 
that the Draa region had been under Moroccan rule before European 
powers interfered with borders. However the Algerians argued that the 
territory belonged to them under French law as well as agreements 
made in 1904 and 1912 with Spain (Heggoy, 20). Small-scale conflict 
between the states would occur in 1962 and 1963, as Morocco would 
move troops into the disputed areas and then withdraw them while 
Moroccan press would use the issue to encourage greater nationalism 
amongst the population (Farsoun and Paul, 1976). The two states 
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would finally engage in war in October 1963 over the disputed area 
which would see Morocco fail to take over the region. The Sand War 
would begin the process of positioning the two states as rivals in the 
region, as talks over Tindouf and the southwest boundaries of Algeria 
would push well into the 1970. In 1972 the Organization of African 
Union would draw the final lines that would result in the Moroccan and 
Algerian border – lines Algeria would ratify and that Morocco would 
allow to stand, even as they failed to ratify (Zartman, 1987).  
Some like William Thompson (2001) have argued that the rivalry 
between Algeria and Morocco “ended” in 1984 (p.577) due to a failure 
of continued military action. However, as Algeria and Morocco continue 
to arm and maintain its current policies in regards to Western Sahara 
as well as each other, this analysis could be questioned. Recently, 
Algeria and Morocco engaged in its own arms race due to 
counterterrorism and the rise of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM), 
although Algeria has been more directly affected by Islamist threats 
(Carney, 2009). Algeria’s links to Russia due to oil supply have helped 
the state to increase its arms buildup that prompted Morocco to 
request and increase in arsenal from the US, the Netherlands and 
eventually France (Carney), although both sides have made clear the 
arming is needed due to the threat AQIM poses to its security. 
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Neither state has sought to provoke the other into armed conflict 
recently. Yet the rise in arms buildup and the continued rivalry 
between Algeria and Morocco has led some like Carney to suggest both 
states are attempting to become more strategically significant to the 
West – especially the United States. As its own rivalry from the past 
moves into the 21st century it becomes more apparent that they 
maintain a steep desire for influence and control. With the borders 
between the states still closed and both states having pulled allies and 
neutral parties towards its side on the Western Sahara issue from the 
Arab League, the African Union and the United Nations (Vaquer, 
2007), each continues to pursue a strategy of counterbalancing each 
other and giving a greater appearance of leadership and authority 
within the Maghreb. 
While both states have failed to take up arms against each 
other, Algeria’s support of the Polisario allows them a proxy to use in 
terms of political and military conflict. Using the Polisario has allowed 
Algeria to insert itself within the discussion for a future settlement of 
the conflict while absolving themselves of responsibility. Considering 
the territorial rivalry between Morocco and Algeria has existed since 
independence (Rasler and Thompson, 49) and that both states 
continue to seek out new advantages against each other due to the 
US’ War on Terror, it should be expected that the rivalry would 
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continue to exist even during periods of friendlier relations. 
Considering both states view each other skeptically and at times as a 
threat to regional stability due to their own hegemonic ambitions, 
friendlier relations may be linked to future agreements over Western 
Sahara. In the case of these states, Western Sahara has been central 
to exploiting its developing rivalry. 
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Chapter 4: Algeria’s Opposition to Moroccan Interests in the 
Western Sahara 
 
This chapter examines perceived goals and objectives of the Moroccan 
government in regards to Western Sahara and examines how Algeria 
has attempted to undermine Morocco’s ability to succeed. The analysis 
is based on Algeria’s hegemonic ambitions and its strategy to counter 
influence by Morocco. The chapter is based on the argument that in 
order to achieve regional hegemony in North West Africa, Algeria has 
attempted to oppose Morocco’s objectives in regards to Western 
Sahara. By working against Morocco’s interests on the conflict, Algeria 
would then be able to offer its voice on a regional and international 
level and strengthen its leadership position in the Maghreb. This would 
then allow Algeria to foster the perception that it is the subregional 
hegemon in the region. 
 The section begins with a presentation of possible goals of the 
Moroccan government in regards to Western Sahara – what the state 
hopes to achieve once incorporation has been accomplished (either 
through direct incorporation or through an autonomy process). These 
goals are created based on research on Moroccan interest in Western 
Sahara. Each possible reason for Morocco’s actions towards an 
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ultimate incorporation of the territory will be examined by looking at 
current and previous public records and information. An examination 
of the current policy practices of Morocco and others can show how 
states have responded to Morocco’s attempts to exert control over 
Western Sahara and shift world opinion in its favor. Further, should 
states show resistance towards Morocco it would suggest that Algeria 
is trying to influence the resolution of the conflict. Algeria’s role or 
influence on each issue will be examined as well, especially in terms of 
how Algeria has been able to successfully challenge Morocco. It will 
also examine if the problems with Moroccan authority over Western 
Sahara are outside the realm of Algerian influence and whether Algeria 
benefits from negative international perceptions of Morocco’s interests 
in the region. 
For the hypothesis of this thesis to be confirmed, there should be 
an indication of Algerian negative influence on how Morocco’s claims 
on Western Sahara are viewed internationally. However, if the findings 
suggest Morocco has been successful in changing regional and 
international views on Western Sahara or the Polisario, then it would 
be considered as weakening Algeria’s position. However, if Algeria has 
been able to maintain previous attitudes on Western Sahara or been 
successful in limiting Moroccan claims on the territory – either through 
direct action or covert support of others – then it would be viewed as 
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strengthening Algeria’s position. Where the Western Sahara issue is 
concerned, both states involved in the matter have been persistent in 
trying to undermine the other. By examining the cases through known 
policy position and published information will allow for a better 
understanding of each state’s ability to promote its agenda as well as 
Algeria’s ability to emerge as the regional hegemon at the behest of 
Morocco in its attempts to gain victory in the conflict. 
In other words, the overall attempt of this research is to 
determine Algeria’s capacity to exert regional –and to some extent 
international leadership on Western Sahara matters. Should it succeed 
in shaping the debate, Algeria would be viewed as a viable regional 
hegemon. 
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Morocco’s endgame? Positioning for regional supremacy 
Morocco’s desire to incorporate Western Sahara creates many possible 
opportunities to enhance its position internationally and within the 
region. In doing so they would be able to not only challenge Algeria for 
regional supremacy, but surpass their rival to be viewed as a possible 
hegemon for the Maghreb. To do this, Morocco would need to achieve 
certain goals against both Algeria and the Polisario to weaken their 
status in the region. To create such goals, this thesis has reviewed 
works from major scholars in the field of Western Sahara – specifically 
Stephen Zunes and Yahia Zoubir, as well as others like Ben-Meir and 
Maghraoui - to examine what Morocco wants. This research helps to 
formulate possible goals of the Moroccan government that would be 
attained once Western Saharan incorporation had occurred. By 
creating these goals, Algeria’s means of challenging Morocco over the 
territory can be better understood. 
One such opportunity over the territory would allow Morocco to 
not only increase its boundaries but also consolidate international 
views on the issue in its favor. A final treaty between the government 
and the Polisario would allow the state to have its boundaries 
internationally recognized and allow Morocco to shift its interests 
elsewhere internally, especially if the result led to the Sahrawi 
population supporting autonomy or integration into the state. This 
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would also allow the international community to recognize Moroccan 
claims on the area and create a greater level of stability in regional 
politics, weakening Algeria’s position within the region and 
undermining the ability of the Polisario to exert influence within 
Western Sahara. As a result, such actions would allow Morocco the 
ability to project leadership and stability within the region and create a 
sense of hegemonic superiority over its neighbors. 
 Secondly, a settlement on the Western Sahara matter would 
force states and organizations to end its support for the Polisario. As it 
stands the continued recognition of the Polisario through recognition of 
the SADR damages Morocco’s ability to exert control over the territory. 
Further, it increases the international standing of the opposition and 
prevents Morocco from achieving any of its long-terms plans in the 
region. As long as other states continue to recognize either the SADR 
as the independent government for the Sahrawi or the Polisario as the 
official representatives of the people, Morocco is limited in exerting 
control over the full territory and must counter its rivals in the region 
for influence and position. By achieving incorporation of Western 
Sahara into Morocco, the Polisario would become marginalized within 
Morocco and would lose support in the international community. 
 The third point regarding Morocco’s desire to incorporate 
Western Sahara deals with resource allocation. Once the territory is 
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legally incorporated, Morocco would have greater access to maritime 
and land-based resources that would make its position in North West 
Africa much stronger. As noted by Sören Lind and Toby Shelly 
(Summary Report, 2010), questions over the control of phosphates, oil 
and fisheries within Western Sahara persist and have become central 
to Morocco’s policy in the region. By having full legal access to the 
resources, rather than the current use of the resources that has run 
into conflict with activist groups, international companies as well as 
the European Union, Morocco would be able to better develop the 
Western Sahara as well as better profit off the resources found in the 
region. This would greatly increase its ability to lead in the Maghreb 
and better position the state compared to Algeria. 
 Finally, all these issues relate to making Morocco a more viable 
regional hegemon. Once the question on Western Sahara has been 
settled, Morocco would be able to build on greater support from its 
Western allies – the United States and France – and better position 
itself in a post-Gadhafi Maghreb region to be the central power base. 
As a greater Morocco would increase its mineral and fisheries wealth, 
the state would be viewed more viable economically within the region 
and decrease the influence Algeria currently has in regional politics. 
Ousting the Polisario from control over the Sahrawi would further 
increase Morocco’s leadership capacity in the region. 
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These four possible objectives of Morocco are central to this 
analysis because in each case Algeria and the Polisario have sought to 
challenge Morocco’s desire to be viewed as the regional hegemon. 
Each suggested goal for Morocco allows it a means to not only solve its 
own problems with Western Sahara, but better position itself 
internationally and within the Maghreb as a major force. Further, by 
resolving the Western Sahara situation, Morocco would be in a better 
position to push for greater regional integration through the Arab 
Maghreb Union (World Bank, 2010). The following sections examine 
each possible goal from both the Moroccan and Algerian example to 
see how Algeria has or has not challenged and undermined the 
Moroccan government. 
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Recognition of Moroccan claims towards Western Sahara 
In terms of recognition, Algeria has been able to use its connections 
with the Polisario on a continental level. However, since capturing 
Western Sahara Morocco has struggled to have its claims on the 
territory recognized outside Africa, let alone within its home region. 
Part of the problem comes with the decision released by the 
International Court of Justice, which in 1975 determined that while 
there were some traditional links between the Sahrawi and old 
Moroccan sultans before Spanish and French rule, those connections 
(typically allegiances of loyalty) were not enough to legitimize 
Morocco’s claims on the territory (Maghraoui, 2003, 115). Rather than 
accepting the results and wait for the Spanish referendum over the 
territory, Morocco sent civilians and troops into Spanish Sahara to 
begin its takeover of the region. The march on Spanish Sahara would 
force Spain towards handing over Spanish Sahara to Morocco and 
Mauritania in Madrid later that year (Maghraoui). 
 Since then Morocco has been engaged in a conflict not only with 
the Polisario over control over the territory, but with the Polisario and 
Algeria over recognition of what they feel is rightfully its. Due to its 
ground invasion after the ICJ ruling, Morocco has been seen as the 
aggressor in the state (Maghraoui, 116) due to the repression of the 
Sahrawi as well as its opposition to the right of the Sahrawi to self-
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determination as dictated by the UN and the ICJ. Some have raised 
the point (Maghraoui, 124) that separation of Western Sahara from 
Morocco would damage its sovereignty – a position taken by the 
United States to this very day (Arieff).  
 In Morocco’s favor is the unwillingness of many in the 
international community to push for a solution. Morocco has been a 
willing ally of the US and from a geopolitical scope plays an important 
balancing role in North Africa for Washington (Zunes and Mundy, 72). 
Further, it is the position of the US that allowing a Sahrawi vote on 
independence could destabilize the Moroccan monarchy, which would 
threaten a major ally in North Africa (Zoubir, 2009) that has become 
more important during the War on Terror.  
In addition to the US, Morocco receives more aid from France in 
maintaining the current situation. France has been a champion for 
Morocco within the Security Council and is in many ways a 
counterbalance to the objectives of its former colony Algeria. 
Accordingly, it is advocating a solution to the conflict that would better 
support the regime in Rabat – one in which Western Sahara would be 
under Morocco’s sovereignty while allowing autonomy for the Sahrawi. 
The French government was also instrumental in successfully altering 
the discussion over Sahrawi independence and was able to wedge 
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themselves within the proposed Baker Plan in 2001 (Zunes and 
Mundy, 78). 
This position allows Morocco protection from the UN when it 
comes to Western Sahara, and France was willing to endorse 
Morocco’s proposal for autonomy for Western Sahara with no 
possibility of self-determination (Zoubir 2009, 985). However, the 
position has been limited as France, the US and Spain did push for 
Morocco to provide a “credible” solution with the failure of the second 
Baker Plan in 2003 (Zoubir, 2007). Further, in 2009 US Secretary of 
State Hilary Clinton said the following in regards to Morocco’s plan for 
Sahrawi autonomy: 
“Well, this is a plan, as you know, that originated in the Clinton 
Administration. It was reaffirmed in the Bush Administration and 
it remains the policy of the United States in the Obama 
Administration. Now, we are supporting the United Nations 
process because we think that if there can be a peaceful 
resolution to the difficulties that exist with your neighbors, both 
to the east and to the south and the west that is in everyone’s 
interest. But because of our long relationship, we are very aware 
of how challenging the circumstances are. And I don’t want 
anyone in the region or elsewhere to have any doubt about our 
policy, which remains the same. (Zoubir, 2010)” 
 
As long as the US remains committed to the autonomy plan 
suggested by Morocco, Morocco gains enough international clout to 
weaken pressure by Algeria and others to compromise with the 
Polisario and the Sahrawi nationals. With the US maintaining a neutral 
stance officially on the territory (Al-Manar Slimi, 2009) even after its 
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willingness to support the Baker plan in 2003, Morocco is further able 
to utilize their major allies’ disinterest in allowing for an independent 
Sahrawi homeland to continue to propose its own plans over control 
over the territory. 
In 2011, Morocco reiterated its interest in negotiating a proper 
settlement over Western Sahara while further arguing its position over 
the conflict and the Polisario. For instance, Moroccan Foreign Minister 
Taïb Fassi Fihri said the following: 
“Morocco reiterates its full readiness to pursue and intensify the 
negotiation process to find a consensual political solution to the 
artificial regional dispute over the Moroccan Sahara, on the basis 
of the autonomy initiative that the Security Council has 
considered, through six successive resolutions, as serious and 
credible (UN, 2011)” 
 
 Morocco continues to push its goal for incorporating Western 
Sahara into Morocco thanks in part of support from allies in France and 
the US, but also due to the UN considering autonomy as a viable 
option instead of full independence. 
Algeria, on the other hand, has sought to utilize the invasion and 
Morocco’s attempts to control the territory to its advantage. While 
Morocco views international resistance to recognizing its claim as 
based on Algerian manipulation (Maghraoui, 124), there are some 
within Algeria that fear that should Western Sahara be recognized as 
the “Southern Provinces” of Morocco that it would not only throw off 
the balance of power in the region, but whet appetites in Rabat to 
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pursue claims towards Tindouf and southwest Algeria (Zoubir 2007). 
Considering Algeria’s own fear of conflict, it has sought to challenge 
Morocco’s claims to the territory and back the Polisario and the SADR 
as the legitimate power over the area. This comes from its historical 
support for self-determination of people and Algeria’s own history of 
conflict with France. Jacob Mundy says as much when examining 
Algeria’s role in the conflict: 
“…self-determination is an important aspect of the normative 
framework through which Algerian nationalism constitutes itself 
and through which the Algerian government has tended to 
articulate its foreign policy. The ideal of self-determination 
indisputably played a key discursive role in Algeria’s struggle for 
independence and so there is a sense in which Algerian leaders 
seen in Polisario clear parallels with their struggle for 
independence. Support for Western Saharan resistance is thus 
not only consistent with Algeria’s national values, but also its 
history.” (Mundy, 2010, 3-4)” 
 
Algeria has been most vocal on the international stage in its 
support for the Sahrawi cause and helped the state gain entry to the 
Organization for African Unity and the successor African Union – which 
Morocco withdrew from in 1984 and remains the only nonmember on 
the continent. Algeria has also seen other states recognize the SADR 
or the Polisario as the official voice of the Sahrawi and support the 
idea of Sahrawi self-determination (Benabdallah, 2009). As states 
show support for the position made by the UN in the 1970s – that 
Western Sahara should be governed by the Sahrawi - Algeria has not 
directly created this development but has been able to benefit from 
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state’s sympathies for the Sahrawi as a means of limiting Morocco’s 
perceived aggression. 
In the end, Algeria’s greatest argument against Morocco’s claims 
on Western Sahara is that no state besides Morocco – not even its 
strongest supporter France – recognizes it (Zoubir 2007, 167). When 
Morocco made its 2007 autonomy proposal, Algeria and the Polisario 
were able to reject it outright as it failed to include an option for 
independence, and positioned Morocco as the aggressor state yet 
again. It is this conflicting development between them that Algeria has 
been able to use against Moroccan interests. Algeria, while not forcing 
the matter beyond supporting the Sahrawi cause, will continue to 
benefit from Morocco’s inability to have its claims recognized. In this 
way, Algeria can be viewed as a stronger force in the region. 
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Ending recognition of the Polisario abroad 
Morocco has, since the takeover of Western Sahara, sought to 
challenge the Polisario’s base abroad. While it is somewhat focused on 
having the territory recognized as part of a greater Morocco, lessening 
the Polisario’s support abroad would allow Morocco a better advantage 
in negotiating any possible solution with the group. Because of 
Algeria’s continued support for the Polisario, Morocco has been 
“bogged down” (Arieff, 6) and less capable to assert dominance and 
leadership in the region, thereby weakening its capacity as a possible 
regional hegemon in the long term. 
 To Morocco’s credit, as the war and stalemate has dragged on, 
the numbers have begun to fall on its side. With Morocco fostering the 
perception of the Polisario as a front for Algerian aggression, as well as 
pushing its own agenda for autonomy within Morocco, it has been able 
to persuade states to withdraw recognition for the SADR. Morocco has 
been aided by France, which has been accused of paying off states to 
withdraw its support for the Polisario and the SADR (Zoubir 2007).  
Unlike its interest in keeping Morocco from incorporating 
Western Sahara, Algeria has a greater need to develop and maintain 
the Polisario presence. Algeria has a legitimate concern about a future 
solution between the Polisario and Morocco, since the SADR are based 
within Algerian borders. As such, it has become more and more 
48 
 
apparent to Algeria to advocate for more recognition of the Polisario as 
the official government for Western Sahara. With the number of 
nations  that recognize either the Polisario as the voice of the Sahrawi 
or the SADR as the official representative of Western Sahara (see 
Appendix 1) shifting over time, Algeria has been able to count on other 
states to show at least sympathy with the cause of the Sahrawi and 
with the Polisario – leverage they can utilize against Moroccan interest. 
 Algeria’s other success in preventing the marginalization of the 
Polisario is its strict refusal to participate in negotiations. While many 
may question Algeria’s actual interest in the conflict, they have stayed 
out of all negotiations regardless of pressure. While some, like 
Mohammed Benouna (the Moroccan UN representative) have argued 
that Algeria should be forced to negotiate since “Polisario cannot 
negotiate without the blessing of Algeria (International Crisis Group, 
2007),” Algeria has always maintained the position that it is only 
concerned for the Sahrawi and that the Polisario speak for the people. 
Mohammed Tefiani, the director of Algerian relations with the rest of 
Africa, said that Algeria “reject[s] any approach that attempts to force 
an Algeria-Moroccan dialogue on Western Sahara (ibid).”  
 While it would be impossible to show that Algeria has directly 
weakened Morocco’s ability to remove the Polisario from the global 
stage, on this point Algeria shows its ability to undermine its rival. 
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Rather than speak as a concerned party under the auspices of “self-
determination,” Algeria is able to press its own views without directly 
involving itself in the negotiations. Should Algeria be forced to 
negotiate with Morocco, the Polisario’s relevance would become rather 
nonexistent and the views of the Sahrawi would be diminished. 
Whether the Moroccan government agrees with it or not, the Polisario 
is considered the voice of the Sahrawi people, and as long as Algeria 
stays, or at least acts, above the fray, the Polisario will be able to 
maintain supporters and recognition. Even with the money flowing to 
buy off states for support, Algeria’s willingness to play by the UN’s 
rules allows it to continue to undermine Morocco’s objective and keeps 
the Polisario as a threat to the future integration of Western Sahara 
into Morocco. 
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Access towards maritime and interior resources 
Morocco’s interest in incorporating Western Sahara does go beyond 
the idea of “greater Morocco.” With Western Sahara’s possible sites of 
natural resource development, the territory becomes far more valuable 
beyond nationalist desires. Morocco has made it a point that its work 
in the territory is part of greater development for the region, and will 
only help to take the Sahrawi population forward. While there may be 
a legitimate question over how much control Morocco would allow an 
autonomous Sahrawi region within its border in terms of negotiations 
for resource extraction, the fact that Morocco has already begun to 
profit from the territory means Morocco is in a position to legitimize its 
control over the area. 
 Indeed, with the state trying to profit on the sale of fish 
contracts and phosphates, Morocco would be wise to integrate the 
Western Sahara within its legal boundaries. As it stands, states 
continue to struggle with dealing with products sold from Western 
Sahara, as noted by the Stockholm Environmental Institute in 2010 
(Summary Report). The group, in a conference dealing specifically with 
the sale of phosphates and its effects on food supply and management 
and how it affects Western Sahara, argued it would be wise to boycott 
the sale of such products from the region since they were taken 
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illegally – tying the debate back to full legal recognition of Morocco’s 
stewardship of the territory as part of its “Southern Provinces.” 
 Another part of this debate stems from conflict with the Polisario 
over the control of waterways. The Polisario had sought in 1987 an 
agreement with the European Union to promote fisheries along the 
coast line – an agreement the EU declined. However, the EU would 
reach the same agreement with the Moroccan government in 2006, 
one that the Polisario called “a massive enterprise of plundering and 
amassing of natural wealth…and a flagrant violation of international 
law (Benabdallah, 423).” and others criticized   
Yet in terms of undermining Morocco’s ability to profit from such 
resources, Algeria has sorely failed to push any agenda. As it stands, 
much of the push-back on Morocco’s investment come from the 
Sahrawi activists abroad, the Polisario as well as other activist groups 
that question the sale of goods from the territory. Algeria itself, having 
been focused on the political endgame, has expressed no views on 
matters over resources outside the confines of Sahrawi control over 
them. With Algeria marginalized as long as Morocco is able to sell 
phosphates and work out fishing deals with other states that enter 
Saharan waters, it stands to have little to no footing in undermining its 
rival. 
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Yes, Morocco continues to profit from its dealings abroad in 
terms of major resources. Yet as long as the borders remain unsettled, 
Morocco will continue to feel pressure from outside organizations and 
companies that will not purchase goods or create contracts that profit 
from Western Sahara goods. While this may weaken Morocco in the 
eyes of investors and activists, Algeria has not been able to profit from 
the conflict in a leadership role outside calling for a political solution to 
the boundaries of Morocco and the self-determination of the Sahrawi. 
As it stands, Algeria has failed to directly undermine Morocco in this 
point. While Algeria has no direct influence on other states concerning 
the extraction of resources, they will benefit over time should states 
begin to resist the opportunity to trade with Morocco goods coming 
from the territory. But its success is incidental and not based on its 
own involvement on the issue, lessening its image as a regional leader 
on this issue. 
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Strengthening Morocco’s position in the Maghreb and abroad 
With Algeria and Morocco as regional rivals for dominance, each seeks 
a means to position itself as a regional leader. Both states had been 
competing for influence against Libya, but with the recent change in 
government in Tripoli there is a greater chance to exert leadership in 
the region in order to diminish Libya’s standing and become the 
stronger force in the Maghreb. With Tunisia in transition and 
Mauritania considered a weaker state comparatively, it allows the two 
to engage in direct challenges against each other in the region and 
abroad. 
 Algeria has sought out means to challenge Morocco politically 
and economically for leadership in the region for some time. While 
Morocco has been able to benefit from Sahrawi resources due to the 
failure of a final framework that would address the state, Algeria has 
been able to promote itself as a “champion of colonial peoples and 
alienates Morocco from regional leadership (Carney, 2009).” As Africa 
itself tends to regionalize itself within clusters, the failure of the 
Maghreb to unite has been linked to Algeria and Morocco’s battles over 
Western Sahara, and Algeria has been rather successful in promoting 
its own agenda against its neighbors within the African continent. 
One aspect is the role of the US and France and how its position 
towards Morocco has influenced the lack of a successful peace plan. In 
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2003 James Baker presented to the UN a draft resolution for a possible 
peace deal. While including clauses for a vote that would offer the 
option of integration or autonomy within the state to the Sahrawi, 
Morocco rejected the deal because “independence” was included as 
part of the agreement, which they argued was incompatible with the 
territorial integrity of Morocco and could lead to instability in the 
region (Zunes and Mundy). Thanks in part to the War on Terror, both 
Morocco and Algeria have become major players to the United States 
in North Africa (Solá-Martin, 2009). Since Morocco has become more 
important to the US, it creates a new level of rivalry between the two 
sides in their attempt to position each as the more desirable state in 
the region. 
In 2009, as a response to the 2007 initiative taken by Morocco, 
Secretary of State Clinton continued to promote American support for 
the Moroccan plan. More support came in 2010 by members of the US 
Senate, who called the proposal for autonomy under Moroccan control 
“the ‘sole realistic solution’” (Ben-Meir, 65). Algeria, while maintaining 
pressure on the African Union and to some extent in the UN, continues 
to see its views brushed aside by the West, especially the United 
States. Actions taken by Algeria and South Africa in 2011 to prevent 
Morocco’s election to the Security Council highlight this further 
(Bennis, 2011), as they were unable to convince fellow members of 
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the UN that there would be a risk of the Western Sahara conflict 
ending on less than favorable terms for the Sahrawi. Both states, 
major supporters for the Polisario and Sahrawi independence, failed to 
reduce the votes needed for Morocco to earn a seat in the council. In 
this framework, actions taken by Algeria in support of the Polisario 
tend to be overridden by the West. However, with others questioning 
the usefulness of Algeria in negotiations over a future peace plan, it 
could lead to a strain between the West and Algeria if it is viewed as 
an obstacle to peace.  
 The result of such actions taken has led Algeria to both 
strengthen and weaken itself and Morocco on the global stage. As both 
struggle to be viewed as the major player in Maghreb affairs and to 
champion its positions abroad, Algeria has been forced to work behind 
the scenes to weaken its neighbor. While such actions have proven 
successful in Africa and help to strengthen its position there, Morocco’s 
greater international appeal and support weakens Algeria’s best 
attempts to weaken its rival. On this point, it appears that Algeria is 
only marginally successful in undermining Moroccan hegemonic 
objectives. However, the longer the Western Sahara conflict plays out 
and the longer the Algerians support the Polisario with no major 
resolution benefiting them, the more likely Algeria will become a 
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weakened force in the region and be forced to accept Morocco’s 
positions on the territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Chapter 5: Summary and Conclusions 
Algeria and Morocco have fought against each other for well over a 
century, from French colonial rule to the Sand War of 1963. Both 
states have sought to expand their borders and influence within the 
Maghreb region, utilizing calls for greater national unity as a means to 
rally support for their cause. In the case of Western Sahara, Morocco’s 
historical demands to the land led to conflict between the Moroccan 
Army and both Spain and the Sahrawi people. The Sahrawi, seeking 
independence from Spain, fought against Morocco under the support of 
the Polisario Front since 1975. Algeria, having allowed refugees from 
Western Sahara into the Tindouf region in the southwest corner of 
Algeria, has played a major supporter of Polisario actions since 
Morocco’s march into the territory, and continues to provide political 
support to this day. Morocco has been able to reclaim most of the 
territory in Western Sahara from Polisario rebels and create a small 
zone that the Polisario is able to work from in the state. 
 The historical conflicts between Algeria and Morocco help create 
political problems for both states in regards to Western Sahara and the 
future of the Maghreb. Both see the possibility of being the major 
power amongst its neighbors in the Maghreb and even beyond. As long 
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as the Western Sahara conflict persists, tension between the two 
states will lead to questions over who has more power and influence in 
the region. In the case of Algeria, every attempt to weaken Morocco’s 
claims and control over Western Sahara makes their ability to exert 
power over their neighbors much easier.  
 Utilizing a dual approach that incorporates the ideas of the 
regional hegemon with the security issues coming from rivalry studies, 
this thesis has attempted to examine whether there could be a causal 
link between supporting minor opposition groups and how such 
support can benefit a state’s hegemonic superiority over its neighbors. 
While the case presented works only in terms of understanding Algeria 
and Morocco, such a notion could prove useful towards understanding 
rivalries between states. However, in this case Algeria’s continued 
support for the Polisario Front and its backing of the Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic has only given it minor advantages in its rivalry 
with Morocco. 
 Algeria’s successes in frustrating Morocco’s case for 
incorporating Western Sahara tend to be based on the role of the 
Polisario. First, Algeria’s continued international support for the 
Polisario helps to maintain some international interest in the group and 
the interests of the Sahrawi for independence. Algeria has been very 
successful in getting the SADR a seat on international organizations 
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and maintaining pressure of Morocco from other states in regards to 
the treatment of the people. Secondly, Algeria’s refusal to talk to 
Morocco on Western Sahara frustrates future peace plans and 
undermines Morocco’s ability to negotiate an agreement for 
incorporating the territory. As long as Algeria observes talks and does 
not participate, they maintain the perception that they are not 
involved in the process and that they are only there for the Sahrawi 
people and their long term goal of independence. 
 Finally, Algeria has used the Polisario as a means to weaken 
Morocco’s presence internationally. While Morocco won their seat to 
the Security Council, the issue of Sahrawi independence or 
incorporation were used by Algeria and South Africa to build a case 
against Morocco winning the seat. Further, Morocco’s ability to sell 
resources found in Western Sahara has been harmed as groups put 
pressure on governments to not accept goods from Morocco. While 
Morocco has been able to negotiate deals on oil and phosphates, 
Polisario supporters have put states in the position to reexamine deals 
and not agree to certain plans. This would allow Algeria the ability to 
replace Morocco in energy trading and strengthen Algeria’s place in the 
region. 
 As long as the Moroccan government is able to impose its own 
rules on the Polisario, Algeria will be forced to work from a defense 
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position to maintain its relevance and prevent Algiers from being 
directly involved in any settlement. As long as Algeria continues to 
back the Polisario, Morocco will not be able to impose an agenda that 
could be viewed by some as aggressive due to its noninterest in self-
determination for the SADR. Economics and international politics, 
however, have not been as kind in forcing Morocco’s hand as much as 
Algeria would hope it would. Instead, the challenges facing Morocco 
over Western Sahara tend to fall outside the interests of Algeria and 
do little in the long run to suddenly challenge the status quo between 
the states. 
 The thesis opens up future studies on how Algeria itself moves 
forward towards achieving greater dominance in the Mahgreb as well 
as raises interesting questions for future study. Algeria’s own stability 
would come into question should Morocco successfully incorporate 
Western Sahara, as those in government fear that the failure of 
Morocco to accept the OAU’s findings in 1972 over the Draa Valley 
would lead to future conflict. The role of Algeria in handling refugees 
also sets itself for study, as the state could be faced with a greater 
Sahrawi population if Morocco forces a resolution of their own. 
Morocco’s ambitions within the Maghreb have been studied for some 
time but with the Mediterranean Union’s relationship between the EU 
and Northern Africa, Morocco would be interested in aligning itself 
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more with Europe and creating a power position within their home 
region. Other directions future research on the conflict could examine 
how ethnicity and culture between the Berber Sahrawi and the more 
Arab Moroccan population could be a catalyst for conflict over the 
future of the territory. 
 With Morocco ascending to the Security Council for a two year 
stay, there is now a greater chance for Morocco to press for an 
advantage and gain leverage and dominance over its rivals. For the 
time being, however, Algeria has shown through its linkage with the 
Polisario that it is able to achieve minor advantages and gains that 
weaken its rival. Until the Western Sahara matter is properly settled, 
Algeria will still be viewed as an obstacle towards peace due to its 
rivalry with Morocco, but Algeria will continue to see itself as a 
defender of the rights of self-determination for all, and use this belief 
as a means to further undermine Morocco both in the Mahgreb and on 
the global stage. 
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Appendix A 
Recognition of Moroccan and Polisario/SADR claims on 
Western Sahara 
 
Recognition of the SADR (ordered by Date of Recognition) 
(Note: asterisk denotes full diplomatic relations and the exchange of 
ambassadors) 
 
*Algeria (March 6, 1976) 
*Angola (March 11, 1976) 
Mozambique (March 13, 1976) 
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic (March 16, 1976) 
Rwanda (April 1, 1976) 
*Panama (June 23, 1978) 
Tanzania (November 9, 1978) 
Ethiopia (February 24, 1979) 
Vietnam (March 2, 1979) 
Laos (May 7, 1979) 
Ghana (August 24, 1979) 
Guyana (September 1, 1979) 
Jamaica (September 4, 1979) 
Nicaragua (September 9, 1979) 
Uganda (September 6, 1979) 
*Mexico (September 8, 1979) 
Lesotho (October 9, 1979) 
Cuba (January 20, 1980) 
Iran (February 27, 1980) 
Sierra Leone (March 27, 1980) 
Syria (April 15, 1980) 
Libya (April 15, 1980) 
Botswana (May 14, 1980) 
Zimbabwe (July 3, 1980) 
Mali (July 4, 1980) 
Chad (July 4, 1980) 
*Vanuatu (November 27, 1980) 
AFRICAN UNION (February 22, 1982) 
*Mauritius (July 1, 1982) 
*Venezuela (August 3, 1982) 
Suriname (August 11, 1982) 
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Bolivia (December 14, 1982) 
Ecuador (November 14, 1983) 
Mauritania (February 27, 1984) 
Nigeria (November 11, 1984) 
Trinidad and Tobago (November 1, 1986) 
Belize (November 18, 1988) 
Barbados February 27, 1988) 
*El Salvador (July 31, 1989) 
Honduras (November 11, 1989) 
Namibia (June 11, 1990) 
Malawi (November 16, 1994) 
*Paraguay (February 9, 2000) 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (February 14, 2002) 
*Timor-Leste (May 20, 2002) 
*South Africa (September 15, 2004) 
Uruguay (December 26, 2006) 
Haiti (November 22, 2006) 
*South Sudan (July 9, 2011) 
  
Suspended/Cancelled Recognition of the SADR (ordered Dates of 
Recognition) 
Madagascar (February 28, 1976, Frozen July 4 2005) 
Burundi (March 1, 1976, Cancelled relations May 5, 2006) 
- Reestablished June 16, 2008, Cancelled October 25, 2010 
Benin (March 11, 1976, Cancelled relations March 21, 1997) 
Guinea-Bissau (March 15, 1976, Withdrew recognition March 1997) 
- Reestablished relations May 26, 2009, withdrew March 20, 2010 
Togo (March 17, 1976, Cancelled relations June 18, 1997) 
Seychelles (October 25, 1977, Cancelled relations March 17, 2008) 
Congo, Republic of (June 3, 1978, Cancelled relations September 13, 
1996) 
Sào Tomé and Príncipe (June 22, 1978, Cancelled relations October 
23, 1996) 
Equatorial Guinea (November 3, 1978, Withdrew recognition May 
1980) 
Cambodia (April 10, 1979, Withdrew recognition August 14, 2006) 
Afghanistan (May 26, 1979, Withdrew recognition July 11, 2002) 
Cape Verde (July 4 1979, Frozen July 27, 2007) 
Grenada (August 20, 1979, Cancelled relations August 16, 2010) 
Dominica (September 1, 1979, Withdrew recognition July 22, 2010) 
Sait Lucia (September 1, 1979, Cancelled relations August 16, 2010) 
Zambia (October 12, 1979, Cancelled relations March 29, 2011) 
Swaziland (April 28, 1980, Suspended August 4, 1997) 
Costa Rica (October 30, 1980, Frozen April 22, 2000) 
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Kiribati (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations September 15, 2000) 
Nauru (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations September 15, 2000) 
Papua New Guinea (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations April 2, 
2011) 
Solomon Islands (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations January 1989) 
Tuvalu (August 12, 1981, Cancelled relations September 15, 2000) 
Burkina Faso (March 4, 1984, Cancelled relations June 5, 1996) 
Peru (August 16, 1984, Frozen September 9, 1996) 
Colombia (February 27, 1985, Frozen December 2000) 
Liberia (July 31, 1985, Cancelled relations September 5, 1997) 
India (October 1, 1985, Cancelled relations June 26, 2000) 
Guatemala (April 10, 1986, Withdrew recognition April 1998) 
Dominican Republic (June 24, 1986, Frozen May 23, 2002) 
Saint Kitts and Nevis (February 25, 1987, Cancelled relations August 
16, 2010) 
Antigua and Barbuda (February 27, 1987, Cancelled relations August 
16, 2010) 
Albania (December 29, 1987, Cancelled relations November 11, 2004) 
Kenya (June 25, 2005, Frozen July 20, 2006) 
 
 
Recognition of Sahrawi claims on Western Sahara 
AFRICAN UNION 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burma 
Burundi 
Chad 
China, People’s Democratic Republic of 
Chile 
Congo, Republic of 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
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Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Fiji 
Finland 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Iran 
Ireland 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Korea, Republic of 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Portugal 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Sào Tomé and Príncipe 
Sierra Leone 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
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South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Uganda 
UNITED NATIONS 
United Kingdom 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
 
States that recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara 
Morocco 
 
States that recognize Moroccan claims on Western Sahara 
ARAB LEAGUE 
Azerbaijan 
Bahrain 
Benin 
Belarus 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
China, People’s Democratic Republic of 
Chile 
Cambodia 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Djibouti 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial Guinea 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Hungary 
Indonesia 
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Kuwait 
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Madagascar 
Maldives 
Nauru 
Netherlands 
Niger 
Liberia 
ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Russia 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Turkey 
Yemen 
 
Sources: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_status_of_Western_Sahara 
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